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Liang Qichao in Australia | China Heritage Quarterly
Liang Qichao in Australia: a sojourn of no significance?[1]
Gloria Davies 黃樂嫣
Monash University
The following article was first published in East Asian History, No.21, June (2001) pp. 65-111. It is reproduced here with some minor revisions.—The Editor
It is commonplace nowadays to draw attention to the narrative structure of historical accounts and to note that a certain discursive contiguity exists between this mode of scholarship and storytelling. Historians, however, will also point out that the dictum of veracity must remain irreducible if historical narration is to be distinguishable as a work of professional scholarship from mere storytelling. Thus, in the telling of any 'story' about Liang Qichao 梁启超, we are faced with the question of how we might locate historical veracity when it is contingent on one or another form of narrative structure. Does our ability to relate the occurrence of events by providing the right kinds of textual documentation, and in adequate quantities, satisfy one or another norm of veracity acceptable to the profession? To what extent is veracity affected by the sequence according to which we order a certain set of events, the rhetorical operations we perform in the act of description, the decisions we make in either departing from or adhering to conventional and authoritative readings of a known historical topic?
It goes without saying that the point of posing these questions is not to encourage an unreflective response that affirms one particular account over other possible acts of historical representation. Rather, the point is to reflect on the different forms that sense making can take. Very often, the form that we regard as the most intimate and authoritative, namely the 'internal' perspectives that we seek to mine from the range of published and unpublished accounts produced by actual historical individuals themselves, assumes the privileged position of historical veracity. We tend to assume that our 'primary sources' will yield a certain fundamental and incontrovertible truth about the past, no matter which mode of interpretation we bring to bear upon them.
Liang Qichao is a significant name in any general account of China's modern history because of its close association with the Hundred Day Reform of 1898, a major event in the narration of modern China. Although Liang Qichao is the subject of a research industry that covers many different aspects and stages of his intellectual and political career, the Hundred Day Reform remains the key event that launched his career and to this day, it continues to secure the historical significance of his name. Even though he played only a minor role in the reform program of this time, he was widely recognized as Kang Youwei's 康有为 protégé, and thus received social and political cachet from his close association with the man who was personal adviser to the progressive Guangxu Emperor.
In this context, what is most interesting about Liang Qichao's sojourn in Australia is that, in order to tell this story, we must rely on a set of primary sources that differ significantly from the ones that form the bedrock of research on Liang Qichao. Liang's significance is located mainly within Chinese intellectual history where he is often regarded in hypostatic terms as 'the mind of modern China', as the title of Joseph Levenson's seminal work has it.[2] Similarly, Xiaobing Tang's recent theoretically inflected study of Liang Qichao focusses on Liang's ideas in relation to historiography, nationhood, revolution, modernity and culture. The title, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: the Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao, tellingly informs us that, once again, it is Liang's mind that is at issue. Tang's approach, while drawing significantly on theoretical concepts of cognitive spatial mappings and paradigm shifts, nonetheless adheres to a certain narrative structure of 'the man and his ideas' that constitutes the norm of scholarship on Liang Qichao.
This structure owes in no small part to Liang himself who was one of the most prolific essayists of his time and who published his opinions on a vast range of issues. To historians, the 'man' himself thus becomes secondary to the 'mind' since 'he' constitutes the incomplete fragments of the lived everyday that the historian gleans from diary jottings, contemporary accounts, newspaper reports and so on, only in order to enhance our understanding of the grander (totalistic) intellectual project that 'Liang Qichao' signifies. It is as if stories of the man are merely there to help explain why the 'mind of modern China' might have chosen to think the way that 'it' – as befits its hypostatic status – did. Liang's representativeness as the pioneering mind of modern China has directed historians to examine his life primarily through his voluminous collected writings, published as Yinbingshi wenji (collected essays) 饮冰室文集 [3] and Yinbingshi zhuanji (collected works) 饮冰室传记, in tandem with Liang Qichao nianpu changbian 梁启超年谱长编, the authoritative chronological biography of Liang Qichao edited by Ding Wenjiang and Zhao Fengtian. Liang's Australian episode has a very small presence in these texts and is comprised of the following:
- a total of twenty-three poems written whilst in Australia or shortly after his departure,
- two letters of which one was addressed to his mentor Kang Youwei written while Liang was about to leave Australia and the other, written a month after Liang returned to Tokyo, to members of the Protect the Emperor Society (Bao huang hui) in Sydney
- a long nationalist tract 'Tracing the Sources of Our Cumulative Weaknesses,' (Jiruo suyuan lun 积弱溯源论) which was to have been the first chapter of a historical project of sixteen chapters about China in the decade between 1890-1900 that Liang began in Australia but never completed.
Liang Qichao left behind little of his personal impressions of Australia in this slim body of writings. This stands in marked contrast to the substantial accounts he produced of his travels in the United States in early 1900 and 1903, which include many personal correspondences. For someone who was estimated to have produced an average of 330,000 words each year over 33 years, reaching a peak of 450,000 words in 1902, when he founded the New Citizen Journal (Xin min congbao 新民丛报) in Tokyo some eight months after leaving Australia, Liang was uncharacteristically quiet in Australia. Indeed, most of what we know about his visit takes the form of articles published in the Australian English and Chinese language presses of the time. Thus we are led by the sources of his Australian journey, indeed the inadequacy of the textual remainders, to focus much more on the man than on his ideas. But precisely because Liang matters, above all, as 'the mind' and not 'the man,' we are still led ineluctably to anticipate an intellectual discovery in spite of Liang's reticence, and it is with this proleptic caution that I now begin my tale.
Prologue to a Journey: Divided Loyalties and Political Defeat
Liang Qichao first expressed interest in raising funds from among the overseas Chinese communities in Australia in a letter he wrote to Kang Youwei dated 4 April 1900 when he urged Kang to visit Australia instead of going to Hawaii as Kang had planned. By this time, Liang and Kang had been travelling overseas for some eighteen months, settling temporarily in different parts of the world, as political exiles each with a price of 150,000 taels on his head offered by the Qing government to would-be assassins.[4] In the wake of the coup d'etat staged by the Empress Dowager's faction on 21 September, 1898 that brought the Hundred Day Reform to an abrupt end and effectively placed the Emperor himself under house arrest, Kang Youwei's political authority in China as personal adviser to the Emperor was extinguished. As Kang's deputy, Liang Qichao suffered the same political demise as his mentor and both were judged by the Qing government to be criminals at large. Yet their international reputations were enlarged rather than diminished by their flight from China. In the era of early modern trans-national communications in which the Hundred Day Reform occurred, political events in China were increasingly newsworthy items that found daily representation in the major newspapers of modern nations. That the major Australian newspapers of the day often carried reports of events in China is a measure of their identification with, indeed even subservience to the interests of the British Empire. By 1898, the idea of a modern world system was already being predominantly defined by the commercial interests of the advanced capitalist nations of the United State, Britain, France and Germany, extending as these interests of capitalist expansionism did to different parts of the world including China.
In the two years between Liang Qichao's flight from China after the Hundred Day Reform and his arrival in Australia, he became a political campaigner and fund-raiser among the various overseas Chinese communities he visited while continuing to write and publish his ideas of political reform. Already internationally renowned as Kang Youwei's deputy, Liang was closely identified during this time with the network of organizations known commonly as Bao huang hui 保皇会 (literally, Protect the Emperor Society). These were established in rapid succession among the various overseas Chinese communities in Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, Canada, and the United States and, by January 1900, in Australia.
The first of these organizations was founded on 20 July 1899 in Vancouver when Kang Youwei arrived there after being forced to leave Japan two months earlier as a result of diplomatic pressure brought on the Japanese government by the Qing court. Kang Youwei had conceived of a two-fold purpose for the organization that he originally named Zhongguo weixin hui 中国维新会 (the China Reform Association, as it came to be known in English). It was intended to rally international support for the Guangxu Emperor then under house arrest and to raise funds for nurturing political resistance within China to the Empress Dowager and the powerful conservative faction she led within the Qing government. It also sought to protect and consolidate the local commercial interests of overseas Chinese communities, with a view to improving the social standing and well-being of the overseas Chinese in the different countries where they had settled. At one of the meetings in Vancouver, a leading member of the overseas Chinese community suggested that since the Emperor had risked his life to save the people, the organization should be re-named Bao huang hui (Protect the Emperor Society) to highlight the crucial importance of the Emperor to the reform process. This suggestion was acted upon and the organization was re-named although it continued to be known in English as the China Reform Association.[5]
When Liang set sail for Fremantle on the steamliner Brittania from the port of Penang on 7 October 1900, his political career in exile had reached a very low point. Less than two months earlier on 22 August, 1900, his friend Tang Caichang 唐才常 and several of his former students had been arrested and executed under orders from Zhang Zhidong 张之洞, governor of the Hunan-Hubei region, for attempting to stage the overthrow of the Qing government. This was an ambitious attempt, masterminded by Liang and Tang, to stage an uprising that would lead to the declaration of the independence of central China from Peking and the establishment of a new constitutional government in which both Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao would play leading roles.
It is known that even before the Hundred Day Reform, Liang Qichao had begun to differ from Kang Youwei in his ideas of reform. The issues that divided Sun Yat-sen 孙逸仙 and Kang Youwei – in brief, the former's ambition of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty to found a modern republic and the latter's insistence on constitutional monarchy – were matters of expediency rather than of principle for Liang. His writings of this period express a desire for the establishment of democratic institutions and the cultivation of an active and nationalistic citizenry but betray little preference for either constitutional monarchy or republicanism.[6] In the year or so that Liang lived in Japan from late 1898 onwards, editing and writing for the Tokyo-based Qingyi bao 清议报(Upright Discussions), a newspaper established on 23 December 1898 two months after his arrival, Liang Qichao began to drift even further from Kang Youwei in both his activities and the ideas he espoused.
By the time Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao arrived in Japan, Sun Yat-sen had already built strongholds for his revolutionary party within the overseas Chinese communities in Hawaii and Japan.[7] Sun had previously extended several invitations of mutual cooperation to Kang in order to consolidate the effectiveness of the political movements they each led. Kang had repeatedly declined Sun's invitations on the grounds that he was, as Joseph Levenson puts it, 'definitely committed to peaceful change and would have no relations with the revolutionaries.'[8] When Kang and Liang reached Tokyo in 1898, Sun again tried to approach Kang on the subject of cooperation and failed. Harold Schiffrin has suggested that Kang's refusal to cooperate with Sun probably owed to his scholar-gentry bias against the Western-educated Sun who was unschooled in Confucian values, as well as to Kang's own considerable reputation as the Guangxu emperor's personal adviser.[9] Sun Yat-sen's republican cause would have eventually presented significant problems for Kang whose former close association with the emperor was crucial to the advancement of his political cause of constitutional monarchy overseas. Unlike Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen, Liang Qichao did not lead a political movement and although a prominent activist, he was mainly interested in writing about and publicizing the cause of reform. In Japan, Liang was introduced to a diverse range of texts on European philosophy, history and science in Japanese translation and soon began to reflect republican ideas in the reformist organ, Upright Discussions. Quoting an account by the revolutionist Feng Ziyou 冯自由, Schiffrin notes that Liang's leanings towards anti-Manchuism at this time led Kang Youwei to destroy the plates of 'a particularly seditious article' that Liang had planned to publish in the newspaper.[10]
When Kang Youwei was forced to leave Japan for Canada in March 1899, Liang's leanings towards republicanism and his enthusiasm for ideas of nationalism, democracy and socialism were no longer restrained by the disapproval of his teacher and mentor. At this time, Liang was the editor and chief writer for Upright Discussions and the foundational headmaster of the Great Harmony High School (Gaodeng datong xuexiao 高等大同学校), the Tokyo-based upper-level extension of the Great Harmony School, a modern Chinese school jointly established by Chinese reformers and revolutionists in Yokohama in 1897.[11] Despite his reputation as Kang Youwei's foremost disciple and deputy, Liang began to level scathing criticism against the Qing government, calling for its destruction in direct opposition to Kang's unrelenting defence of the imprisoned Manchu emperor.
Liang Qichao met Sun Yat-sen in the early spring of 1899 and when Kang left Japan for Canada, he began to work closely with Sun towards promoting the revolutionist cause. Drawing from various Chinese sources, Schiffrin writes:
In his negotiations with Sun, he [Liang] is said to have agreed to become second in command under the revolutionary banner. Sun calmed his fears about Kang's fate by saying, 'If the disciple becomes a leader, will not the master be even more exalted?' And according to the story, Liang himself asserted that Kang could keep on writing books, and if he disagreed with the revolutionary program, they would pay no attention to him.[12]
Meanwhile, with the establishment of the first Protect the Emperor Society in Vancouver, Kang Youwei's reformist cause rapidly gained ground among the leaders of various overseas Chinese communities who were eager to be associated with the Guangxu emperor's former personal adviser. In late 1899 Liang, having negotiated an alliance with Sun, sent a letter to Kang, signed by twelve other members of the reformist camp, suggesting that the master retire from politics and that both reformers and revolutionaries be united under a new organization established on republican principles. Kang, then in Hong Kong, had already learnt of Liang's planned alliance with Sun from members of the reformist group still loyal to him such as Xu Qin 徐勤. In great anger, he wrote back to his mutinous disciples, denouncing their intentions and ordering Liang and Ou Qujia 欧渠甲, who were chiefly responsible for the proposed alliance, to travel to Hawaii and San Francisco respectively to campaign on behalf of the reformist cause.[13]
Liang obeyed his former mentor but remained on friendly terms with Sun Yat-sen and even asked for Sun's help in advancing his own work in Hawaii. Sun provided Liang with a letter of introduction to his elder brother Sun Mei 孙眉, a wealthy Chinese businessman known locally as 'King of Maui' in Hawaii. Sun was later to regret the assistance he rendered Liang when the latter made serious inroads into Sun's power-base in Hawaii. Liang's success in depleting the ranks of Sun Yat-sen's Revive China Society (Xing Zhong hui 兴中会) in Hawaii to establish the rival Kang Youwei-led Protect the Emperor Society (Bao huang hui) as the leading political movement of the day angered Sun who accused Liang of betraying their agreement of cooperation. In letters written during this period, Liang sought to assure Sun that he still advocated anti-Manchuism in principle but justified his work for the Protect the Emperor Society on the grounds that the public furore over the Empress Dowager's plan to depose the Guangxu emperor by naming a new heir-apparent (an imperial decree whose announcement coincided with Liang's arrival in Honolulu) made it expedient for him to promote the ideal of popular government for the time being in the name of protecting the emperor. In a letter dated 28 April 1900 which represents Liang's last conciliatory gesture to Sun since the latter chose not to respond, Liang urged Sun to realize that 'the pro-emperor slogan … was too valuable to be sacrificed.' He argued that republicanism 'could best be realized by first restoring the emperor to power and then making him president of the republic.'[14]
It was in Hawaii that Liang Qichao hoped to attract substantial donations from his overseas Chinese supporters for the armed uprising in Hankou that he had first planned with Tang Caichang in Tokyo in 1899. Liang had discussed the proposed uprising with Sun Yat-sen whose revolutionary group was then planning to stage a similar revolt in Guangdong. While Liang and Sun had conceived of their respective plans as ultimately unified in purpose, the bitter rivalry between the reformist and revolutionist groups for donations from the same overseas Chinese communities posed serious difficulties for their proposed cooperation. Since both groups looked to the same finite albeit considerable pool of overseas Chinese funds to develop their projects, they were forced to compete with one another for the attention and support of their potential donors. In 1899 and 1900, the luminous prestige of recent personal association with the Guangxu emperor that Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao enjoyed, coupled with their notable scholar-gentry credentials, made them international social and political celebrities who far outshone Sun Yat-sen in newsworthiness. As Zhong Gongyu 钟工宇 (a.k.a. Chung Kun Ai), one of Sun Yat-sen's closest friends, recalls of Liang's visit to Honolulu:
Everyone wanted to meet this famous reformer. I too called and fell under the spell of the man. A group of us were so enthusiastic that we formed a branch of the 'Protect Emperor Party' [Bao huang hui] … We collected subscriptions to send to the main bodies in Macao and Hong Kong. In all, I must have sent $30,000 of our currency. Liang himself was in great demand as a speaker. His intimate, behind-the-scene sketches of political intrigue and corruption in Peking, his picture of the pitiful Emperor Guangxu imprisoned in a small pavilion in the South Lake within the Forbidden City, and his outline of the reforms that would be necessary to make China a modern country; these and other talks kept our enthusiasm at white-heat … Many persons gave Liang money for his personal use.[15]
Liang's talent as a raconteur contributed to his success as a political campaigner and he would often shrewdly flaunt his own 'insider's' knowledge of the imperial court. This was a winning formula that he would later repeat in his political campaigns in Australia. Liang had originally planned to make Hawaii merely the first of a series of fund-raising destinations in the United States, across which he would travel in order to raise 'millions of dollars' towards the armed uprising to be led by Tang Caichang in Central China.[16] These plans came to nought when an outbreak of bubonic plague in Hawaii, occurring a few weeks after Liang's arrival, led the U.S. government to impose a ban on all Chinese travelling to the mainland. Moreover the health authorities in Hawaii had accidentally set fire to the entire Honolulu Chinatown in an attempt to curb the plague. This resulted in Chinese property owners incurring losses of an estimated three million dollars (for which the Hawaiian government compensated them for only half that amount two years later), which greatly reduced the amount of money that they were able to donate to Liang's cause in 1900. Zhang Pengyuan observes that this series of unfortunate events occurring in the first weeks of Liang's stay in Hawaii effectively sealed the fate of the doomed uprising.[17]
In 1899, when Liang Qichao, Tang Caichang and other members of the reformist group who were Liang's supporters began to discuss the possibility of staging an uprising in Central China, they were mostly under thirty years of age. Joseph Esherick further notes that though they were descended from lower gentry families,
[…] many had shown a disdain for literary studies and an interest in boxing, swordsmanship or secret societies during their adolescence. All of them felt a deep sense of patriotic mission in the years following China's defeat in the war with Japan.[18]
Soon after arriving in Hawaii, Liang took the bold step, unprecedented by Kang or Sun, of joining the Triads (Sanhe hui 三和会) in order to rally support from this powerful secret society, which had many members in Hawaii, to his increasingly militant cause. This move reflects Liang's highly pragmatic approach to political activism during this time as both he and Tang Caichang had already decided to recruit troops from among the secret societies in the Yangzi Valley for their Independence Army (Zili jun 自立军), the military force that would launch their uprising.[19]
Although the uprising was not originally planned to coincide with the Boxer trouble in the north, the rapid escalation of attacks on foreigners in the early months of 1900, culminating in the Qing court's declaration of war on the foreign powers on 21 June 1900, provided a window of opportunity that Liang and the other organizers of the proposed Hankou uprising found irresistible. The Qing court had encouraged the disturbances created by the Boxers in Peking and other parts of northern China. This produced a complex situation where influential provincial governors like Zhang Zhidong and Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 in central, south and south-east China held independent discussions with the representatives of foreign powers and disavowed Peking's declaration of war but without rejecting the legitimate authority of the Qing court. Both leading reformers and revolutionaries, including Sun Yat-sen, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Tang Caichang, were also engaged in negotiations with these provincial governors and with foreign consuls in the hope of gaining their support at a time when the future of the Qing dynasty appeared uncertain.[20]
In order to make the reformist uprising seem more palatable to these politically powerful individuals, Tang Caichang even formed a skeletal parliament, the Chinese Congress (Zhongguo yihui) which met in mid-1900 in Shanghai and comprised some of the leading scholars of the time. The Congress presented a manifesto to the British consul-general in Shanghai on 26 July 1900 requesting British help in restoring the emperor in exchange for a Chinese constitutional government which, if established, would be based on the British model and would employ foreign advisers.[21] The British, however, had doubts about the competence of this Congress and preferred to rely on the provincial governors to restore political and social order in the aftermath of the Boxer rebellion. The Congress's claim to political legitimacy, like that of the Protect the Emperor Society, rested on what was essentially Kang Youwei's self-arrogated authority as the imprisoned Guangxu Emperor's envoy in exile. The fragility of this claim was exacerbated by what Schiffrin has observed as a generally disparaging attitude on the part of the British to Kang's ideas, evidenced in the internal correspondences of the British Foreign Office, even though they 'were much more solicitous of his welfare than they were of Sun's':
Acting Consul Bourne, for example, who interviewed Kang as he fled on the S.S. Balaarat on 25 September 1898 [after the coup d'etat] described the reformist leader as being 'stuffed up with nonsense by Timothy Richard.' […] Kang's lengthy communication to the British in Hong Kong, including a copy of his purportedly secret memorial form the Emperor and a denunciation of the Empress Dowager, was considered by the Colonial Office to be no more than a 'quaint effusion.'[22]
Meanwhile Liang Qichao's relationship with Kang Youwei had soured because of the former's earlier act of 'betrayal' and, as several historians have suggested, it was likely that Kang Youwei's support for the uprising, albeit staged in the name of restoring the Emperor, was less than wholehearted. Liang himself experienced difficulties in fund-raising and was unable to deliver more than a fraction of the substantial funds he had earlier promised Tang Caichang who, by the early 1900s, had the enormous responsibility of overseeing the uprising as commander-in-chief of the Independent Army. From his correspondences of the time, Liang appears to have been somewhat erratic and impulsive as a fund-raiser. In early 1900, he heard that an American millionaire had allegedly donated thirty million dollars towards arms for the democratic Cuba cause. Before he had even met with this supposedly generous donor, Liang told Tang he was confident of raising ten million dollars from him.[23] Furthermore, Liang engaged an American businessman to act as his agent in the United States, giving him $20,000 to promote the cause of the reformist uprising among Americans on the mainland when he was prevented from travelling there himself. In his letters to Kang of March-April 1900, Liang expressed the hope that, as Schiffrin summarizes it, 'if the Americans invested money in the pro-emperor movement, they would eventually throw in men and arms to protect their investment.' It was to this same American agent, identified only as Heqin 赫钦 (Hutchins?) that Liang looked to making contact with the alleged pro-democratic Cuba American millionaire. Zhang Pengyuan describes the agent as a confidence trickster whom Liang never heard from again. Schiffrin, reading the same sources, traces Liang's relationship with Heqin to their first meeting in 1898 at Li Hongzhang's office in Peking and notes that Heqin later fought in Cuba.[24]
Zhang Pengyuan notes that of the eighty to ninety thousand dollars Liang managed to raise in Hawaii, he remitted only forty-four thousand to Tokyo and Macau to support the uprising.[25] There are conflicting accounts given of both Kang and Liang's fund-raising activities of this period. Basing his summary on Ding Wenjiang's Biography of Liang and personal accounts by Feng Ziyou and other activists of the era, Schiffrin writes:
It has been estimated that three hundred thousand dollars were subscribed at this time, of which one third came from Qiu Shuyuan 邱菽园[a.k.a. Khoo Seck Wan], the Singapore millionaire, another third from Liang in Hawaii, and the rest from other overseas supporters. According to the Hubei student, Zhu Hezhong 朱和中, Kang kept most of his money and thereby made himself wealthy for the rest of his life. Only $20,000 was sent to Tang Caichang and the latter, according to Zhu, spent most of it in the brothels and gambling dens of Shanghai. Fan Wen-lan 范文澜 claims that Kang raised $600,000 and kept it all for himself. Chung Kun Ai, who had been one of the generous Bao huang hui contributors in Hawaii in 1900, reports his subsequent disillusionment with the organization as a result of his suspicions concerning its financial dealings. A more sympathetic account, however, states that Qiu Shuyuan contributed only $20,000 and that all of it went to the Hankou plotters. The Manchu government exacted revenge by arresting the entire Qiu clan in China.[26]
Insufficient funds gravely affected Tang's ability to organize the Independent Army, made up as it was of mainly secret society recruits whose loyalty could be secured only by promises of substantial financial reward. Meanwhile rumours circulated both within and outside China of vast sums of money being accumulated by the leaders of the Protect the Emperor Society for their war effort in Central China. As a result, leaders of the Ge lao hui 哥老会 (Society of Brothers and Elders), the dominant secret society in the Yangtze Valley who had earlier been cultivated by Sun's revolutionist group shifted their allegiance to Tang and the other reformist organizers of the Independence Army.[27] The funds that Liang raised in Hawaii, which were significantly smaller than he had expected, were further delayed in reaching Tang because of interference from the Chinese consul in Honolulu. Moreover, Kang Youwei's control of the Protect the Emperor Society headquarters in Macau and Liang's greater influence over the Tokyo branch led Liang to send most of the funds he raised to Tokyo rather than Macau. This created dissension within the organization, which led to confusion and mistrust, with both the Tokyo and Macau branches accusing one another of bad faith.[28]
The uprising was scheduled to take place on 9 August 1900, a time when the Boxer Movement was still creating much chaos in the north. Insufficient funds forced Tang to postpone the uprising several times and he had the added difficulty of maintaining the loyalty of secret society recruits who were unhappy with being paid less than they had expected.[29] The date of the uprising was finally set for 23 August 1900 but it had already become clear a day or two earlier that the Qing court (including both the Empress Dowager and the Guangxu Emperor) had been safely evacuated to Xi'an and that Li Hongzhang would be negotiating peace terms with the foreign powers. For Zhang Zhidong, this meant that the Qing dynasty was clearly still the legitimate political authority and with British assistance (since the Independence Army's headquarters were based in the British concession in Hankou), he arrested the leaders of the planned uprising on 22 August and executed them the same day.[30]
Liang Qichao had set sail from Hawaii for Shanghai on 16 July1900 after receiving a telegram from Shanghai urging his return, which indicates that he believed the success of the uprising was imminent. He arrived in Shanghai only to discover that Tang and the other leaders of the uprising had been executed and the secret society recruits for the Independence Army had dispersed. He remained in Shanghai for ten days and then set off for Singapore to meet with Kang Youwei. Soon after, he made his way to Australia.[31] Thus began a period of isolation from friends and allies in Liang's political life. Many within the Protect the Emperor Society held him personally responsible for the uprising's failure and the deaths of twenty members of the organization. Qin Lishan 秦力山, one of the uprising's organizers who managed to escape to Singapore, also accused Kang Youwei of financial mismanagement. Citing Feng Ziyou, Schiffrin notes that Qin's accusations led Qiu Shuyuan, one of the Society's main benefactors, to break off relations with both Kang and Liang. The repercussions continued a few years after the abortive uprising when secret society leaders of the Yangtze Valley who had supported the Independence Army demanded belated payment for their services from Kang Youwei in Hong Kong. They threatened to kill him when he reported them to the police.[32]
Meanwhile, although Liang Qichao's relationship with Kang Youwei had become very strained from late 1899 onwards, he continued to be publicly identified with Kang as deputy leader of the Protect the Emperor Society. Sun Yat-sen had broken off relations with him and survivors of the uprising blamed Liang for its failure. As a result, Liang's support base within the Society was significantly undermined even in his former Tokyo stronghold. Liang does not provide us with his reasons for visiting Australia at this critical period in his life when he was under suspicion and ostracized by those with whom he had been close or whose friendship he had cultivated. That the executed leaders of the uprising included a close friend and several former students would also have deeply affected Liang. Undoubtedly, when he met with Kang Youwei in Singapore, his former mentor would have played some part in directing him to reach the decision to travel to Australia. Occurring as it did between two significant periods of his life that have found ample historical representation in both Chinese and English over the last century, Liang's Australian sojourn is notable for its insignificance in the historical record. As noted at the outset, this is a largely a result of Liang's own uncharacteristic silence. Yet because the period Liang lived in Australia, between late October 1900 and early May 1901, marks the passage from his abject political failure to his resurgence as a leading advocate of nationalist values through his New Citizen Journal (Xin min congbao), it constitutes an interesting narrative gap that invites both reflection and speculation. It also draws attention to both the appeal and impossibility of closure in historical discourse, as the 'why's' that certain recovered textual fragments seem to answer are in turn complicated by the possibilities of reading.
We know that when Liang wrote to Kang Youwei on 4 April 1900, urging him to visit Australia instead of going to Hawaii as Kang had planned, their relationship was already under severe strain. Kang was then in Singapore and Liang was in Hawaii. Kang would have been pleased with Liang's success in fund-raising for the Protect the Emperor Society but deepening internal rivalry within the Society leading up to the failed uprising in August 1900 would tend to suggest that little trust remained between Kang and Liang. In the letter, Liang writes:
Singapore is a place where high-ranking Chinese officials congregate and their influence is too great for us to be effective there. Since Australia is in a remote part of the world, it may be easier for us to gain advantage and support there instead. After all, it is also a British colony but one where Chinese authorities are not present. Therefore, there will be little opposition to our organization and it can easily be developed. Sir, if you are willing to grace that place with your authoritative presence, we will have certain success. Since your movements in Singapore are restricted, you are effectively being forced to be dormant when we are so hard-pressed for time. Sir, do you agree with what I have said?[33]
Three weeks after writing this letter to Kang, Liang made his final appeal to Sun Yat-sen for continued cooperation, proposing that the Guangxu Emperor be made the president of the new republic to be established after the success of the uprising in Central China. Some months earlier, towards the end of 1899, prominent overseas Chinese in Sydney had issued an invitation to Kang Youwei to visit them, an invitation that Kang did not act upon.[34] In October 1899, Kang had personally written to Quong Tart (Mei Guangda 梅光达), arguably the most prominent overseas Chinese merchant in Sydney of the time, urging him to form the Australian branch of the Protect the Emperor Society. Kang's letter was supported by an open letter to the Chinese in Australia issued by the then nascent Vancouver branch of the Society reiterating the urgency of the Emperor's restoration. Yip Ung (Ye En 叶恩), the president of the Vancouver branch, further echoed Kang's appeal in his letter to Quong Tart. Quong Tart, however, had fallen out with the other Chinese merchants in Sydney keen on setting up the Society and therefore refused to have any part in its formation.[35] It is likely that the loss of this influential benefactor undermined Kang's interest in the Society that was eventually formed in Sydney, in Kang's absence, in January 1900.
Shortly after the Sydney branch of the Protect the Emperor Society was established, it issued invitations to both Kang and Liang to visit Australia. On 7 April 1900, Tung Wah News (Donghua xin bao东华新报), the leading Sydney-based Chinese language newspaper, reported that the Society's Sydney branch had raised £3,000 for Liang's travelling expenses.[36] The report also noted that owing to Kang's age, members of the Sydney branch had not expected the international leader of their Society to make the long and arduous journey to Australia. What is remarkable about this explanation is that Kang was only forty-two years old at the time, hardly an old man. But despite the seriousness of the Sydney branch's invitation to Liang, it is clear that he had no interest in visiting Australia in April 1900 as he was then busy raising funds in Hawaii and planning for his own triumphant return to China in the event of the uprising's success. Meanwhile, Liang had also formed a romantic attachment to He Huizhen 河蕙珍, a young overseas Chinese woman in Hawaii who acted as his interpreter. Prior to leaving Hawaii for Shanghai, Liang wrote to his wife (Li Huixian 李蕙仙) that he had not seen He Huizhen for almost a month in order to avoid negative publicity; that his feelings for her had caused him much emotional turmoil and that in all his twenty-eight years, he had not seen himself in such a ridiculous state.[37]
This lengthy prologue provides an important context for Liang's visit to Australia insofar as it indicates the complexity of Liang's political and personal life at the time of his visit. Soon after the failed uprising and the execution of its leaders, when Liang found himself under suspicion from within his own organization and shunned by Sun Yat-sen and former associates within the global Chinese activist network, he had expressed a desire to retire from politics to become a monk.[38] But a month or so later he chose to continue with his political career by setting off to campaign for funds in Australia in his capacity as international deputy leader of the Protect the Emperor Society.
The Chinese In Australia: 1900-1901[39]
By the time Liang Qichao visited Australia, the economic activities of the overseas Chinese communities here were already markedly different from the predominant activity of gold-mining that characterized the communities of the 1850s when southern Chinese sojourners first arrived in great numbers. Many of the gold-mines were depleted and the numerous miners who had not made enough money to establish their own businesses or return to China turned to different kinds of manual labour for their livelihood.[40] Market-gardening attracted the majority of these former miners while cabinet-making also flourished. Hawking, laundering and cooking were also dominant occupations.[41] But the few who made a fortune in gold-mining in the later half of the nineteenth century were able to distinguish themselves from the majority of the working class Chinese in Australia by joining the ranks of an emergent Chinese merchant elite.
Chinese merchants became a significant group in the overseas Chinese communities of Australia in the late nineteenth century when increasing numbers of Chinese arrivals from the 1850s onwards created a demand for imported Chinese goods.[42] By 1901, the merchant class represented 11.1 percent and 15.6 percent of the Chinese populations in Victoria and New South Wales respectively.[43] Unlike their labouring counterparts, Chinese merchants conducted their business with people from both the European and Chinese communities. In the two decades after 1870, the rapid decline of the Chinese mining population in rural areas was concomitant with a significant increase in the number of Chinese people in urban areas, especially in the cities of Melbourne and Sydney.[44] This period also saw the Chinese merchants' rise to social and political power as leaders of county guilds and societies that were established within the various Chinese communities. The function of these guilds and societies was to protect the interests and to regulate the behaviour of their members; that admission was granted solely on the basis of one's county origin indicates the presence of mutual prejudice and rivalry between people from different counties.
At the time of Liang Qichao's visit, these county guilds and societies were well established in both Sydney and Melbourne. In Melbourne, guilds and societies founded by those from the See Yap (Si yi 四邑) and Sam Yap (San yi 三邑) regions were particularly influential because the majority of the Chinese in Melbourne came from counties located in these two regions of Guangdong province.[45] That Liang Qichao was from Sun Hui (also spelt Sunwui, Xin hui 新会) county in the See Yap region added to the interest of local See Yap leaders in his visit. Indeed Liang was to later complain to Kang Youwei that the enthusiasm of the Chinese people in Melbourne for the Protect the Emperor Society extended only as far as his county-ties with them and that their interest in the Society and its proposed reforms evaporated with his departure from Melbourne.[46] The Chinese population in Sydney was more diverse and a greater range of county-societies was established there, including those that catered for the numerous migrants from Chang Shen (Zengcheng 增城), Tung Kuan (Dongguan 东莞) and Chung Shan (Zhongshan中山) counties in Guangdong.[47]
The clannishness of the Chinese in Australia, particularly of those in Melbourne, was exacerbated by decades of hostility towards the Chinese on the part of the European communities and the various discriminatory laws levelled against Chinese immigrants. By forming themselves into county-based groups, the Chinese afforded themselves some degree of social insulation from an unfriendly environment. Restrictive immigration laws were first introduced in Victoria in 1855 when the number of Chinese in that colony increased by some 15,000 between 1854 and 1855.[48] But these laws proved ineffective as Chinese migrants were able to land in New South Wales and South Australia where restrictive immigration legislation was not yet introduced. As gold-fever soared, both these colonies passed restrictive legislation against the Chinese and the number of Chinese arriving in the three colonies of Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia progressively decreased in the period between the early 1860s and the late 1870s. This decrease led to the repealing of restrictive legislation in the late 1870s but by 1880, with the rise in the number of Chinese migrants, particularly in New South Wales, even stricter restrictive legislation was re-introduced. By this time, the European communities were unified in the defence of a White Australia and the majority of Australian workers joined in the fight against Chinese immigration. This overwhelming hostility resulted in high rates of departure among Chinese migrants to Australia during the 1880s. But it is worth noting that the often temporary nature of early Chinese settlement in Australia, with many intending to return to China once they had earned enough money, was also an important contributing factor to the high rates of departure during the 1880s.[49]
The Chinese communities in Australia were largely working class with leadership provided by the merchant elite minority. European communities treated these two classes very differently; while Chinese labourers were strongly discriminated against, affluent Chinese merchants were admired for their ability and social conduct. Indeed, advocates of restrictive immigration legislation were at pains to point out that working-class Chinese were their targets since they were the ones who posed the threat of lowering the standard of living in Australia. Even at the height of debates on anti-Chinese legislation in 1888, a member of the Victorian parliament remarked that, 'All that a Chinese merchant would have to do would be to ask for a permit, and no matter what government was at the head of affairs he would be sure to get it.'[50]
Although they were not the targets of anti-Chinese legislation, the most influential Chinese merchants of the day, together with Chinese clergymen, led the defence of the Chinese in debates on anti-Chinese legislation of the late 1880s. Legislation against the working-class Chinese affected the Chinese elite in Australia in two ways: they suffered from the same humiliation of racial discrimination and the reduction of the Chinese population was detrimental to the merchants' commercial interests in expanding the market for Chinese goods. By the time of Liang's visit, the Chinese population in both Victoria and New South Wales was considerably smaller than what it had previously been. This was particularly true of Victoria where the Chinese population in 1901 (6,347) was only about half its size in 1881 (11,959). The following table, based on published figures in the 1925 Official Yearbook for the Commonwealth of Australia shows a general decline of the Chinese population across the colonies, except for South Australia and Western Australia.
Table 1: Population figures for the Chinese in Australia in 1891 and 1901[51]
|
1891 |
1901 |
New South Wales |
(males) 13,048
(females) 109
|
10,063
159
|
Victoria |
(m) 8,355
(f) 134
|
6,236
111
|
Queensland |
(m) 8,497
(f) 27
|
7,637
35
|
South Australia |
(m) 180
(f) 2
|
270
17
|
Western Australia |
(m) 914
(f) 3
|
1,503
18
|
Tasmania |
(m) 931
(f) 8
|
482
24
|
Northern Territory |
(m) 3,598
(f) 15
|
2,962
110
|
Australia |
(m) 35,523
(f) 298
|
29, 153
474
|
|